Cost-Effective Placement of Phasor Measurement Units to Defend against False Data Injection Attacks on Power Grid
Jun-Hyung Bae
Abstract
This study presents the phasor measurement unit (PMU) placement strategy in the presence of false data injection attacks which is one of the most serious security threats against power grid. It is focused on applications related to supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems where measurement data can be easily corrupted by adversaries without getting caught by the system. To safeguard power grids against malicious attacks, procedures have been proposed to facilitate the placement of secure PMUs to defend against false data injection attacks in a highly cost-effective way. It has formulated a method of identifying measurements that are vulnerable to false data injection attacks. It was discovered that a weak power grid can be transformed into a robust power grid by adding a few PMUs at vulnerable locations. Simulations on the IEEE standard test systems demonstrate the benefits of the proposed procedure.