Noncooperative Equilibrium-Seeking in Distributed Energy Systems Under AC Power Flow Nonlinear Constraints
Paolo Scarabaggio, Raffaele Carli, Mariagrazia Dotoli
Abstract
Power distribution grids are commonly controlled through centralized approaches, such as the optimal power flow. However, the current pervasive deployment of distributed renewable energy sources and the increasing growth of active players, providing ancillary services to the grid, have made these centralized frameworks no longer appropriate. In this context, we propose a novel noncooperative control mechanism for optimally regulating the operation of power distribution networks equipped with traditional loads, distributed generation, and active users. The latter, also known as prosumers, contribute to the grid optimization process by leveraging their flexible demand, dispatchable generation capability, and/or energy storage potential. Active users participate in a noncooperative liberalized market designed to increase the penetration of renewable generation and improve the predictability of power injection from the high-voltage grid. The novelty of our game-theoretical approach consists in incorporating economic factors as well as physical constraints and grid stability aspects. Finally, by integrating the proposed framework into a rolling-horizon approach, we show its effectiveness and resiliency through numerical experiments.