Why a Logic is not only its Set of Valid Inferences
Eduardo Alejandro Barrio, Federico Pailos
Abstract
The main idea that we want to defend in this paper is that the question of what a logic is should be addressed differently when structural properties enter the game. In particular, we want to support the idea according to which it is not enough to identify the set of valid inferences to characterize a logic. In other words, we will argue that two logical theories could identify the same set of validities (e.g. its logical truths and valid inferences), but not be the same logic.
Topics & Concepts
Set (abstract data type)Computer scienceLogical consequenceNon-classical logicEpistemologyArtificial intelligenceCognitive sciencePsychologyProgramming languagePhilosophyLogic, Reasoning, and KnowledgeAdvanced Algebra and LogicPhilosophy and Theoretical Science