Collusion-Resistant and Time-Aware Co-Verification for Edge Data Integrity
Yao Zhao, Youyang Qu, Bo Li, Lu Zhao, Feifei Chen, Yong Xiang, Longxiang Gao
Abstract
<underline xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">M</u>obile <underline xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">E</u>dge <underline xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">C</u>omputing (MEC) has incentivized App vendors to outsource various services and applications to distributed edge nodes for low access latency. However, the data cached on these nodes is vulnerable to both intentional and accidental corruption, necessitating periodic audits of <underline xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">E</u>dge <underline xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">D</u>ata <underline xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">I</u>ntegrity (EDI). Existing solutions either rely on a “fully trustworthy” <underline xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">T</u>hird <underline xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">P</u>arty <underline xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">A</u>uditor (TPA) or leverage blockchain to enhance trust. However, they overlook the security risks brought by the use of blockchain, particularly collusion attacks. Furthermore, while they employ a <italic xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">challenge-response</i> mechanism to enhance efficiency by batch verification, they fail to account for the heterogeneity of edge nodes. To address these challenges, we propose <inline-formula xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"><tex-math notation="LaTeX">$\mathtt {CTCV}$</tex-math></inline-formula>, a <underline xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">C</u>ollusion-resistant and <underline xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">T</u>ime-aware <underline xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">C</u>ollaborative <underline xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">V</u>erification framework. <inline-formula xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"><tex-math notation="LaTeX">$\mathtt {CTCV}$</tex-math></inline-formula> aims to accommodate edge node heterogeneity while enabling public audits and batch verification without introducing additional security risks. Specifically, it incorporates blockchain to allow edge nodes to collaboratively verify EDI without trust dependencies, while mitigating collusion attacks through a carefully designed proof generation and verification approach. Considering the resource and state heterogeneity of edge nodes, <inline-formula xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"><tex-math notation="LaTeX">$\mathtt {CTCV}$</tex-math></inline-formula> employs a <italic xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">time-constrained challenge-response</i> mechanism that sets a time threshold <inline-formula xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"><tex-math notation="LaTeX">$\mathcal {T}$</tex-math></inline-formula> between the verification request issuance and the integrity proof inspection to avoid excessive delays. The selection guideline of <inline-formula xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"><tex-math notation="LaTeX">$\mathcal {T}$</tex-math></inline-formula>, along with the correctness, efficiency, and collusion resistance of <inline-formula xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"><tex-math notation="LaTeX">$\mathtt {CTCV}$</tex-math></inline-formula>, are rigorously analyzed. Extensive experiments validate that <inline-formula xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"><tex-math notation="LaTeX">$\mathtt {CTCV}$</tex-math></inline-formula> is computationally and communicationally efficient compared to three baselines: EdgeWatch, EDI-S, and EDI-V. On average, given 10 edge nodes, <inline-formula xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"><tex-math notation="LaTeX">$\mathtt {CTCV}$</tex-math></inline-formula> outperforms EdgeWatch, EDI-S, and EDI-V with computation efficiency improvements of 7.9, 9.0, and 5.0 times, and communication efficiency improvement of 2063.0, 4.8, and 2.6 times, respectively.