An accessible close-loop V2V charging mechanism under charging station with non-cooperative game
Zekai Li, Yitong Shang, Xiang Lei, Ziyun Shao, Youwei Jia, Linni Jian
Abstract
Since the number of electric vehicles (EVs) grows rapidly, the EVs charging schedule problem has attracted more attention than before. On account of continuous and random power requirement from EVs, the burden of grid will increase and thus jeopardize the stability of grid. In this paper, an accessible close-loop vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) charging mechanism with interaction of energy and information under charging station is proposed to cope with EVs charging schedule problem. And the non-cooperative game model is adopted to analyze the V2V charging mechanism. Furthermore, the optimal strategy algorithm is introduced to get the Nash Equilibrium (NE) of the game. Simulation with 10 EVs illustrates that V2V charging with non-cooperative game can decrease the load variance (0.0701) compared to V2V charging without the game (1.7248). And the convergence of the optimal strategy algorithm can reach in less than 20 iterations.