Stochastic Optimal Energy Management and Pricing for Load Serving Entity With Aggregated TCLs of Smart Buildings: A Stackelberg Game Approach
Rufeng Zhang, Tao Jiang, Guoqing Li, Xue Li, Houhe Chen
Abstract
With the development of demand-side management in the smart grid, load-serving entity (LSE) plays a more important role for consumers, which purchases energy from the electricity market and sells it to consumers. Moreover, aggregated thermostatically controlled loads (TCLs) in smart buildings can provide additional demand response capacities and require efficient energy management methods. This article proposes a stochastic optimal energy management and pricing model for LSE with aggregated TCLs and energy storage based on the Stackelberg game and stochastic programming. The energy management and pricing problem are formulated as a bilevel optimization model. The upper level model aims to maximize LSE's expected profit under market price uncertainties and determines the offering prices to consumers. According to the offering price from upper level model, the lower level model optimizes the power purchasing pattern for consumers of two types of buildings with TCLs: factory and office buildings. The nonlinear bilevel model is reformulated and converted into mixed-integer linear programming using a strong duality theory. The proposed model is validated by numerical studies based on real market prices from the PJM electricity market. In addition, the impacts of energy storage, number of buildings, comfortable indoor temperature limits, and offering price limits on LSE's profit are analyzed.