Equilibrium Stability of Asymmetric Evolutionary Games of Multi-Agent Systems With Multiple Groups in Open Electricity Market
Linfei Yin, Shengyuan Li, Fang Gao
Abstract
The asymptotically stable equilibrium points of asymmetric evolutionary games for multiple groups with multiple game strategies are obtained. The evolution of four groups and more multiple groups in open electricity market are described by the replicator dynamics. Multiple game strategies of the power generation enterprises in open electricity market are studied. Besides, the corresponding asymptotic stability conditions are given by the Lyapunov stability criterion.
Topics & Concepts
Replicator equationStability (learning theory)Electricity marketExponential stabilityEvolutionary game theoryEvolutionarily stable strategyStability theoryLyapunov functionGame theoryEquilibrium pointMathematical optimizationElectricityMathematical economicsComputer scienceMathematicsNonlinear systemPhysicsPopulationDifferential equationSociologyDemographyMathematical analysisMachine learningQuantum mechanicsOpinion Dynamics and Social InfluenceGame Theory and ApplicationsComplex Systems and Time Series Analysis