DNS Tunneling Detection by Cache-Property-Aware Features
Naotake Ishikura, Daishi Kondo, Vassilis Vassiliades, I Iordanov, Hideki Tode
Abstract
Many enterprises are under threat of targeted attacks aiming at data exfiltration. To launch such attacks, in recent years, attackers with their malware have exploited a covert channel that abuses the domain name system (DNS) named DNS tunneling. Although several research efforts have been made to detect DNS tunneling, the existing methods rely on features that advanced tunneling techniques can easily obfuscate by mimicking legitimate DNS clients. Such obfuscation would result in data leakage. To tackle this problem, we focused on a “trace” left by DNS tunneling that cannot be easily hidden. In the context of data exfiltration by DNS tunneling, the malware connects directly to the DNS cache server and the generated DNS tunneling queries produce cache misses with absolute certainty. In this study, we propose a DNS tunneling detection method based on the cache-property-aware features. Our experiments show that one of the proposed features can efficiently characterize the DNS tunneling traffic. Furthermore, we introduce a rule-based filter and a long short-term memory (LSTM)-based filter using this proposed feature. The rule-based filter achieves a higher rate of DNS tunneling attack detection than the LSTM one, which instead detects the attack more quickly, while both maintain a low misdetection rate.