A Large-Scale Behavioral Analysis of the Open DNS Resolvers on the Internet
Jeman Park, Rhongho Jang, Manar Mohaisen, Aziz Mohaisen
Abstract
Open DNS resolvers are resolvers that perform recursive resolution on behalf of any user. They can be exploited by adversaries because they are open to the public and require no authorization to use. Therefore, it is important to understand the state of open resolvers to gauge their potentially negative impact on the security and stability of the Internet. In this study, we conducted a comprehensive probing over the entire IPv4 address space and found that more than 3 million IP addresses of open resolvers still exist in the wild. Moreover, we found that many of them work in a way that deviates from the standard. More importantly, we found that many open resolvers answer queries with incorrect, even malicious, responses. Contrasting to results obtained in 2013, we found that while the number of open resolvers has decreased significantly, the number of resolvers providing incorrect responses is almost the same, while the number of open resolvers providing malicious responses has increased, highlighting the prevalence of their threat. Through an extended analysis, we also empirically show that the use of forwarders in the open resolver ecosystem and the possibility that incorrect or malicious responses can be manipulated by these forwarders.