Cycles of Fire? Politics and Forest Burning in Indonesia
Clare Balboni, Robin Burgess, Anton Heil, Jonathan Old, Benjamin Olken
Abstract
This paper examines the link between electoral incentives and environmental degradation by exploiting a satellite dataset on 107,000 forest fires and 879 asynchronous district elections in Indonesia. Fires represent a cheap but illegal means of converting forested land to other uses, but they risk burning out of control and creating substantial negative environmental externalities. We find a significant electoral cycle in forest fires. Ignitions and area burned decline during election years but steeply increase in the year after. The results suggest that politicians may suppress this activity at times when it might particularly dent their electoral chances.
Topics & Concepts
IncentiveExternalityPoliticsAsynchronous communicationNatural resource economicsForest degradationGeographyEnvironmental protectionEnvironmental scienceBusinessLand useEconomicsPolitical scienceLand degradationMarket economyEcologyEngineeringTelecommunicationsBiologyLawMicroeconomicsConservation, Biodiversity, and Resource ManagementOil Palm Production and SustainabilityFire effects on ecosystems