A Side-Channel Attack on a Hardware Implementation of CRYSTALS-Kyber
Yanning Ji, Ruize Wang, Kalle Ngo, Elena Dubrova, Linus Backlund
Abstract
CRYSTALS-Kyber has been recently selected by the NIST as a new public-key encryption and key-establishment algorithm to be standardized. This makes it important to assess how well CRYSTALS-Kyber implementations withstand side-channel attacks. Software implementations of CRYSTALS-Kyber have already been analyzed and the discovered vulnerabilities were patched in the subsequently released versions. In this paper, we present a profiling side-channel attack on a hardware implementation of CRYSTALS-Kyber. Since hardware implementations carry out computations in parallel, they are typically more difficult to break than their software counterparts. We demonstrate a successful message (session key) recovery attack on a Xilinx Artix-7 FPGA implementation of CRYSTALS-Kyber by deep learning-based power analysis. Our results indicate that currently available hardware implementations of CRYSTALS-Kyber need better protection against side-channel attacks.