A novel mechanism for private parking space sharing: The Vickrey–Clarke–Groves auction with scale control
Meng Cheng, Eren İnci, Su Xiu Xu, Yue Zhai
Topics & Concepts
IncentiveSpace (punctuation)MicroeconomicsIncentive compatibilityVickrey auctionParking spaceMechanism (biology)Control (management)Mechanism designBusinessScale (ratio)Computer scienceVickrey–Clarke–Groves auctionMarket mechanismCar sharingEconomicsIndustrial organizationAuction theoryCommon value auctionTransport engineeringEngineeringMarket economyPhilosophyArtificial intelligenceQuantum mechanicsOperating systemPhysicsEpistemologySmart Parking Systems ResearchAuction Theory and ApplicationsTransportation and Mobility Innovations